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Abstract  
  
The Right to Request policy encouraged and supported NHS community health staff in England to ‘spin out’ 
services into social enterprises. This article considers the processes and outputs of the initiative and reflects 
on the likelihood of positive outcomes for patients being achieved. It highlights lessons for future 
programmes seeking to transfer services out of public ownership.  
  
The Right to Request Scheme  
  
Launched as part of the NHS review led by Lord Darzi (DH 2008a), the Right to Request scheme enabled NHS 
staff providing community healthcare services in England to ‘spin out’ into social enterprises – ‘business[es] 
with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or 
in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners’ (DTI 
2002). Whilst precise objectives of the policy were not defined, the Department of Health (DH) staff guide 
(DH 2008) outlined that beneficiaries would include - staff (by creating conditions where they can ‘innovate 
and lead rather than being told what to do’), patients (through the new organisations having ‘the 
independence, flexibility and responsiveness to innovate and improve services and outcomes’), wider 
communities (‘new organisations would have profits to invest in the community’), commissioners (through 
enterprises developing ‘services to address the wider determinants of health’) and the public-purse as whole 
(‘organisational efficiency would be achieved through less-bureaucratic processes and a more engaged 
staff-group).  
The introduction of the RtR was a significant further step in stimulating a market approach within the English 
NHS system. Previous initiatives had increased patient choice over which provider could provide elective 
procedures (‘Any Willing Provider), introduced a ‘tariff’ based payment system (‘Payment by Results’),  
brought in additional capacity from the private sector (Independent Sector Treatment Centres) and 
introduced a new organisational form that had greater independence from government (Foundation Trusts) 
(see Allen et al 2011). The RtR was a radical development in that it sought to transfer core NHS community 
health services out of public ownership. Whilst this had been achieved in relation to other public services 
such as social care and housing, and in NHS support services such as cleaning and catering, successive 
governments had been unable or unwilling to outsource clinical services on such a large scale.   
A previous pilot scheme had sought to explore the development or expansion of social enterprises delivering 
health (and social care) services (Tribal 2009). This identified a number of barriers, including - the time that it 
takes for new social enterprises to be developed, the uncertainty caused by short term contracts, loss of the 
NHS ‘brand’, and the perception by staff that they will lose their favourable terms and conditions (in 
particular their final salary pension schemes).  RtR introduced specific measures to address these issues, for 
instance through providing a guaranteed contract for between 3 and 5 years and the opportunity for 
transferred staff to maintain their pensions. To overcome the expected resistance from senior leaders there 
was a requirement that PCT Boards had to consider an expression of interest from staff in ‘spinning out’. 
Significant external financial support was provided by central government through the Social Enterprise 
Investment Fund and this provided grants and loans to support the development of business cases (for 
instance in undertaking consultations, providing backfill for key staff and buying in external support) and to 
support the actual launch of the business.   
 
What have been the outputs associated with RtR?  
 
When the scheme was launched in 2008, the 152 PCTs in England employed approximately 200,000 staff 
within £10 billion worth of services that were eligible to apply for RtR (DH 2010). In November 2010 the 
Department of Health estimated that out of these services, 60 social enterprises would be launched. These 
were announced in three waves (see diagram 1) which included only those social enterprise proposals that 
received approval by the PCT Board following an initial expression of interest . Research within one local area 
(Miller and Millar 2011) identified that there were a number of proposals that did not proceed to the 
expression of interest stage, were not approved by the Board or which subsequently ‘died’ following the 
initial approval being granted.  In early 2011 it was reported that ten of these 60 proposed social 
enterprises subsequently dropped out (NAO 2011), and at the time of writing (December 2011) only 38 of 
the 50 remaining projects had been successfully launched.  
  
  
As a ‘target’ for the number of services to be ‘spun out’ was not made (in public at least), it is impossible to 
say if the realised level of outputs can be deemed as a success, but in November 2010 it was estimated by 
the Department of Health that 10% of the staff delivering NHS funded community services will be employed 
by social enterprises (DH, 2010) and that RtR organisations would deliver £0.9 billion of public services by the 
end of 2011 (NAO, 2011). Furthermore, no targets were proposed for the location of the RtR social 
enterprises, however we identified that they were not evenly spread, being largely concentrated in half of 
the English regions.  Therefore, some areas will have a significant proportion of community health services 
delivered by social enterprises, whilst other regions will have none. For instance, in the South West up to 11 
community services will be delivered by social enterprises, compared to none in the North East (see diagram 
2).    
  
What will the outcomes be?  
 
Positive stories of the impact of externalising services into these enterprises are being promoted by the DH 
but in reality it is too early to assess if the broad outcomes will be achieved and sustained over a long-term 
basis. Furthermore, as highlighted by the National Audit Office(2011) no overall outcomes were set for the 
RtR programme and there are no plans at present to complete an evaluation of the long term impact on 
patient care and / or cost efficiency. Estimating the costs of the overall programme would require factoring in 
the salary costs of the staff leading the bid, the wider organisational and system resources connected with its 
development and assurance and arguably also the ‘opportunity costs’ from the services concerned being tied 
up in the process. These costs are not available, but the Social Enterprise Investment Fund invested in 51 
Right to Request proposals at a total cost of £8,333,385 which gives an indication of the set up cost for these 
organisations.   
There are essentially three main routes through which RtR could lead to improvements over the previous 
NHS ownership – firstly, the social enterprises will be able to better engage staff through developing new 
governance and ownership arrangements and this will lead to higher productivity, reduced sickness and a 
willingness to challenge poor practice and so improve quality. Secondly, the need to ‘survive’ in a competitive 
market place will result in the enterprises being swifter to respond to new opportunities and more able to 
convince staff that new working practices are required. Thirdly, even if the new organisations do not deliver 
the suspected improvements, then the transfer out of the NHS means that the services can be tendered out 
more easily (including to private ownership).   
There are examples of previous spin-outs in social care (such as Sandwell Community Caring Trust) and 
leisure services (such as Greenwich Leisure) which have been seen (by the organisations at least) as having 
transformed services. However there are also examples of when spin-outs have not survived (such as Secure 
healthcare which was set up in the pilot programme and collapsed in 2009), and the new social enterprises 
will have to win new (and protect current) business from FTs as well as private businesses. An evaluation of 
the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (Hall and Millar, 2011) indicated that around 10% of social enterprises 
in health and social care subsequently closed down after receiving SEIF investment due to a lack on further 
funding, thereby indicating their vulnerability. In relation to the creation of social enterprises leading to a 
more diverse market of providers, in areas in which all or most of community health services have been 
transferred to a single organisation, it is hard to see how this will lead to more options for patients. These 
large social enterprises could also potentially be interested in taking over smaller providers and so decrease 
competition.  
 
What can be learnt from the processes associated with RtR?  
 
Whilst the end outcomes are unclear, the process of RtR has successfully led to a sizeable proportion   of a 
staff group with a strong loyalty to public sector delivery leading the ‘spin out’ to social enterprise.  In 
reviewing the literature published to date on RtR and the experience of staff groups who set up (or 
attempted to set up) a social enterprise (Miller and Millar 2010; Hall et al 2011; Millar et al 2011, Addicot 
2011; NAO 2011) five clear themes emerge:  
  
1) Selling the benefits of Social Enterprise  
 
  
In RtR, the potential benefits of social enterprise for staff, patients and the community were emphasised by 
the government. For staff such benefits were experienced as the RtR was framed both in a ‘positive’ sense 
(i.e. social enterprises will enable you to deliver services more innovatively) and a ‘negative’ sense (i.e. social 
enterprises will enable you to escape the restrictions of the current bureaucratic system that you are 
currently locked in). The policy therefore sought to assure staff that in leaving the NHS they could ‘keep their 
cake and eat it’, as they would be able to keep the ‘plusses’ but lose the ‘minuses’ of the public sector.   
  
2) Divide & Conquer  
 
If the Department of Health had attempted to ‘force’ staff groups to spin out into social enterprises it is likely 
that the policy would have met overwhelming resistance from unions and the general public. By giving local 
staff groups the power to choose to follow the externalisation route, the RtR arguably secured greater buy-in 
than if senior managers had made the same decision. It also diluted the impact of national union resistance 
as local stewards were often more amenable to the circumstances and concerns connected with the area in 
question (although there were examples of fledgling schemes being abandoned due to staff ballots which 
were influenced at least in part by union representations).   
 
3) Provide nourishment  
 
  
Those who have gone through RtR are often clinicians and will generally have spent their careers within the 
public sector and so have no experience in running their own business. Investment therefore has to be made 
in supporting them to develop the business, management and financial skills needed to develop a business 
case and survive within a competitive market (also see Macmillan, 2010). Mentoring was also helpful as a 
means of support for the leaders of the new organisation and to provide examples of successful approaches 
used in other organisations.   
 
4) Threaten with a stick  
  
In addition to possible positive benefits of RtR,  staff were also ‘warned’ that the likely consequence of not 
spinning out was being transferred to another NHS organisation that they may not have seen as favourable 
to their service such as a large acute Trust or being put out to tender for private sector companies to bid. 
These changes would be led by the senior leadership team and RtR was the only means through which staff 
could have any control over their destiny (it should be noted that the majority of community health services 
have been transferred to other organisational forms within the NHS and the staff concerned may have felt 
this was the right option in their area).   
  
5) Get the locals chiefs on-board  
 
  
The regional variation in the take up of RtR reflects at least in part in the different response from individual 
PCT Boards and their local Strategic Health Authorities. Whilst each case clearly had to be considered on 
merit, there is no doubt that in some areas there was a reluctance or unwillingness to support social 
enterprise spin-outs from those ‘at the top’. It is perhaps understandable why such Boards would be 
unwilling to select an option that could be more time-consuming and potentially vulnerable to organisational 
failure than taking the ‘safe’ option of transferring to another NHS body.  Winning over these Boards and 
the individuals within them required a similar mixture of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ incentives to that deployed to the 
staff groups and this is an aspect that the RtR programme could have improved upon.  
  
Conclusion  
 
The RtR scheme sought to spin-out public sector services as part of a broader reform programme to extend 
the market within English health care. It has been followed in England by a Mutuals Programme to support 
the development of ‘public sector mutuals’, the Right to Provide (which is similar to Right to Request but 
applies to social care staff employed by the Local Authority and health staff in Trusts that have not yet 
become FTs), and social work practice pilots in which local authority teams responsible for children and 
young people who are leaving care are seeking to spin out.   
If all of these programmes are able to achieve or overtake the level of success of RtR in introducing greater 
diversity of provision, then there will be further significant externalisation of services traditionally provided 
by the public sector. The most important issue in relation to the overall success of such programmes is the 
extent to which these new arrangements are in fact able to combine the best of public sector values with the 
responsiveness and efficiency of private business, and this cannot be evaluated for some time to come. 
However, as a minimum, the RtR provides an example of a process through which governments can spin-out 
public sector services in the face of potential large scale opposition from unions and existing healthcare 
institutions and professionals.  
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